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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma took a liberal view in holding a son-
in-law to have an insurable interest in his mother-in-law, who had lived
with him and looked after his home and children.18 In Illinois it is said
by way of dictum that a decree of divorce ordering the husband to pay his
divorced wife alimony gave her an insurable interest in his life.19 Where
a man named his wife or his heirs as beneficiary in his policy, but on the
wife's death changed the beneficiary to a married woman, later divorced,
with whom he went to live and who took care of him until his death, an
Illinois court held that she prevailed over his heirs. 20 In Arkansas it was
decided that though a son-in-law has no insurable interest in his father-in-
law, this defense can be asserted only by the insurer and not by a rein-
surer.21 It has been held in that state that a son-in-law had no insurable
interest in the life of his father-in-law from the mere fact that the father-
in-law lent the son-in-law money, was willing to lend him more and was
kindly disposed to him, but the real basis for the decision seems to be that
at the time the policy was taken out the father-in-law was 60 years old,
thus giving rise to a suspicion that the policy was taken out as a wager.22
S. J. B.
INSURANCE-ToTAL DISABILTY BENEFITS-CHRONIC INTOXICATION AS
SELF-INFLICTED INJURY-[Oklahoma].-Is a disability resulting from
chronic alcoholism the "result of a self-inflicted injury" within the meaning
of that term as used in a life insurance policy providing for disability bene-
fits? This question was recently answered in the negative by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court on the facts in the case of New York Life Insurance Com-
pany v. Riggins.'
In this case by the terms of a life insurance policy the premiums were
to be waived during the total disability of the insured. The policy also pro-
vided that the disability benefits were not to be available if the disability
of the insured resulted from a "self-inflicted injury." In an action on the
policy the insurance company disclaimed liability because of non-payment
of premiums. It contended that the disability benefits should not be al-
lowed on the ground that the disability was caused by the chronic alcohol-
ism of the insured which was due to his intentional drinking of intoxicating
liquor, and hence was a "self-inflicted injury" within the terms of the
policy.
In rejecting this contention the court pointed out that although the in-
sured intended to drink the liquor, "he did not in fact intend to bring about
18. Mut. Aid Union v. Stephens, 97 Old. 283, 223 Pac. 648 (1924).
19. Begley v. Miller, 137 Ill. App. 278 (1907). The insured himself pro-
cured the policy, thus eliminating the necessity of her having an insurable
interest in his life.
20. Johnson v. Van Epps, 14 Ill. App. 201, aff'd in 110 Ill. 551 (1883).
21. American Ins. Union v. Manes, 150 Ark. 315, 234 S. W. 496 (1921).
22. Home Mut. Ben. Ass'n v. Keller, 148 Ark. 361, 230 S. W. 10 (1921).
1. 61 P. (2d) 543 (Okla., 1936).
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the condition known as chronic alcoholism resulting in partial brain destruc-
tion.. ."2 The court relied on an analogy to cases interpreting the self-
destruction clauses of insurance policies which have held that an act in-
tentionally committed which unexpectedly causes death does not come with-
in the terms of a policy excepting the insurer from liability in case of self-
destruction. 3
Thus in Courtemanche v. Supreme Court, I. 0. F. 4 it was held that al-
though the insured's death was caused by his voluntary act in taking car-
bolic acid in order to frighten his wife into giving him money, the insurer
could not escape liability on the policy which excepted self-destruction, be-
cause the result was not intended by the insured. This is the prevailing
view 5 and has been followed by cases in Illinois6 and Kansas." Presumably
the problem concerned in the Courtemanche case would not arise in Missouri
in view of the statute which makes void any provision excepting suicide in
a life insurance policy unless the insured contemplated suicide at the time
he applied for the policy.8 However, in the case of Shaw V. Mutual Pro-
tective Insurance Company9 the Missouri court held that a nervous break-
down caused by overwork was not a "voluntary act" within the terms of a
life insurance policy which provided for a sick indemnity.
It should be noted that the court in the instant case did not consider the
casual relationship between the insured's voluntary intoxication and the
consequences that followed, as was done in the case of Mutual Life Insur-
ance Company v. Lawrence,'0 and as is done in fixing criminal responsi-
bility apart from certain unusual statutory crime." Neither did the court
consider the presumption that a man intends the consequences of his volun-
tary act,12 but based its decision wholly on the question of the insured's
2. Supra, note 1.
3. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Hazelett, 105 Ind.
212, 4 N. E. 582, 55 Am. Rep. 192 (1886) ; Michigan Mutual Life Insurance
Company v. Naugle, 130 Ind. 79, 29 N. E. 393 (1891).
4. 136 Mich. 30, 98 N. W. 749, 64 L. R. A. 668, 112 Am. St. Rep. 345
(1904).
5. In Equitable Life Insurance Society v. Paterson, 41 Ga. 338, 5 Am.
Rep. 535 (1870) the court held that although the insured drank to intoxi-
cation and while intoxicated took an overdose of laudanum and died there-
from, this was not "dying by his own hand" within the terms of the policy.
See also 37 C. J. 552. For a collection of cases on this point see 6 Cooley,
Briefs on the Law of Insurance (2d ed. 1928) 5434.
6. Gooding v. United States Life Insurance Company, 46 Il. App. 307
(1892); Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Smith, 39 Ill. App.
569 (1891).
7. Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Wiswell, 56 Kan. 765, 44 Pac.
996, 35 L. R. A. 258 (1896) ; In Grand Legion of Select Knights A. 0. U. W.
of Kansas v. Korneman, 10 Kan. App. 577, 63 Pac. 292 (1901) the court
held that the act which resulted in death must have been done with the
purpose and intent that it should result in death.
8. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 5740.
9. 9 S. W. (2d) 685 (1928).
10. 8 Ill. App. 488 (1881).
11. See 1 Wharton, Criminal Law (1932) secs. 65 to 70.
12. State v. Hart, 309 Mo. 77, 274 S. W. 385 (1925); Jacobs v. State,
17 Ala. App. 396, 85 So. 837 (1920) ; People v. Gilmore, 320 Ill. 233, 150
19371
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actual intent. However, in view of the long line of analogous cases which
interpret self-destruction clauses as requiring specific intent, the decision
appears to be sound.
0. R. A.
SUBROGATION-PRIORITY OF CREDITORS-TAxATION-UNJUST PREFERENCE.
-[Federal].-Plaintiff tendered certified checks drawn on defendant bank
to the United States Collector of Internal Revenue in payment of taxes.
The defendant bank failed and the certified checks were dishonored. The
statute which authorized the collector of internal revenue to accept certified
checks tendered in payment of taxes also gave him power to exact payment
from the original tax debtor in case of failure of the certifying bank." The
collector exercised this option of collecting from the plaintiff and was duly
paid. The taxpayer then received an assignment of the government's stat-
utory lien and priority2 along with the return of the certified checks. The
plaintiff now claims the right to be subrogated to the government's lien and
priority on the basis of the general rule that a guarantor who pays his
principal's debt is, at least as far as the principal is concerned, entitled to
be subrogated to all the rights of the creditor whom he has paid.3 Held; in
an action against the reorganized bank, plaintiff taxpayer is subrogated to
the government's statutory lien and priority.4
The principle that a surety for a debtor of the government, on payment
of the debt is entitled to the government's priority was enunciated in En-
gland as early as 1888.5 It is also firmly entrenched in the United States.0
N. E. 631 (1926). However, in Trembly v. Fidelity, 243 S. W. 201 (Mo.
1922) the court held that the law presumes that a self-inflicted death was
accidental and not suicidal, in the absence of any evidence to rebut the
presumption.
1. 36 Stat. 965, 26 U. S. C. A. see. 1546 (1934); 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 109(1925). This statute codifies the Law of Merchants that a holder of a
certified check may seek payment from the drawer of the check who has
had it certified himself. Bigelow, Bills Notes and Checks (Lile's ed. 1928)
sec. 206; Randolph National Bank v. Hornblower, 160 Mass. 401, 35 N. E.
850 (1894). Even though certification was procured by drawer upon re-
quest of payee.
2. Supra, note 1.
3. 2 Williston, Contracts (1927) sec. 1267; Phelps v. Scott, 325 Mo. 711,
30 S. W. (2d) 71, 71 A. L. R. 290 (1930).
4. American Tobacco Co. v. South Carolina National Bank, 15 F. Supp.
215 (D. C. E. D. S. C., 1936).
5. In Re Lord Churchill, Manistry v. Churchill, 39 Ch. Div. 174 (1888).
6. See cases enumerated 60 C. J. 762; Comment, 26 Col. L. Rev. 492,(1926); For a strongly contra opinion see In Re So. Phila. State Bank's
Insolvency, 295 Pa. 433, 145 AtI. 521 (1929) ; Comment, 78 U. of Pa. L. R. 120,
a case which held this rule of law to be based on an erroneous conception
of early English decisions. The court declared that the common law prece-
dents show that such subrogation was not due to the application of laws of
equity but as a matter of sovereign grace, granted only after the king had
given his consent. Since the court could find no true equity, it refused to
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